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of rent payments when the utility of the premises was totally destroyed
for the lessee's business purpose.
It is submitted that the court adopted the correct interpretation
of the statute. It is remedial in nature, and should be interpreted in
a manner which will correct a condition that is unfavorable to the
tenant. It is believed that the common-law requirement of total
destruction of premises, before a tenant could be relieved, is too harsh.
The Kentucky statute should be construed reasonably, in the light of
modem business practices. It is so unusual for any building to be
completely destroyed, that such a result should probably be excluded
from consideration. It is reasonable to assume, in light of the intention
of the General Assembly, that the word "destroyed" should be given
a liberal meaning, favorable to the tenant. The word should describe
an event which renders the premises useless for the purpose for which
they were leased, for then their value and utility are truly "destroyed"
as far as the tenant is concerned.
RoBERT A. PALmiz
ToRTs-LcRNsaEs AND Tkm DUTY OwED Timm.-Plaintiff, a minister,
went to defendant's garage to solicit money from the proprietor. Plaintiff was told that the latter was on the second floor of the garage. An
unidentified employee of defendant's led plaintiff to a freight elevator,
the only method of reaching the second floor. With plaintiff aboard,
the elevator ascended half-way, then suddenly dropped a foot or so,
causing plaintiff to lose his balance and fall to the first floor. It
developed that the elevator had fallen several times in the past, but
that it had been recently repaired and was thought to be in perfect
condition. Held: Judgment dismissing plaintiff's action affirmed.

Ockerman v. Faulkners Garage.1
The court in this case was faced with two problems. First, it had
to determine the status of the plaitiff, i.e., whether he was a trespasser,
licensee or business invitee. Second, it was required to define the exact
duty owed to a person of that particular status.
In determining the status of the plaintiff the court examined the
purpose for which he was on the land. Ascertaining that he had come
to solicit money for his own purposes-that there was no mutuality of
business interest between the plaintiff and the defendant-the court
applied the principles laid down in the Restatement of Torts, sees. 3302
1

Ockerman v. Faulkner's Garage, 261 S.W. 2d 296 (Ky. 1953).

330 (1934): "A licensee is a person who is privileged to enter or remain upon land by virtue of the possessor s consent, whether
BESTATENMNT, TORTS sec.

given by invitation or permission.

RECENT CASES

and 832,3 and concluded that plaintiff was a licensee, not an invitee. 4
In this case it was reasonably clear that there was no mutuality
of business interest between defendant and plaintiff. Although plaintiff's interest in the solicitation may have been a "business" one, the
defendant's interest was not.5 At just what point the business interests
of the occupant of the land and those of the solicitor coincide sufficiently to constitute a "mutuality of business interest" is not certain.
This case, however, may be taken as authority for the view that a
common interest in a religious organization is not within the definition.

It is interesting to speculate whether the result would have been
different if the plaintiff had been soliciting on the defendant's premises,
but in response to a specific invitation. The Kentucky court has occasionally stated that a mere invitation converts one into an invitee. 6
This invitation may be express, or as is more often the case, implied
from a business relationship. But at any rate, it is the invitation, not

the mutuality of business interests, that is the touchstone of the law,
according to this viewpoint. It may be logically satisfying to hold that
if one is on the land in response to an invitation he is an invitee, but
the great weight of authority, including the Restatement of Torts, requires a mutuality of business interests and therefore militates against
such a conclusion. 7 Most Kentucky cases are in agreement with the
majority rule, s and it is hoped that the view to the contrary has been
abandoned and that the Kentucky rule is now settled in accord with
the majority view as expressed in the Restatement. The principal
case is, of course, additional authority for the Restatement position.
'RESATEWMENT TORTS see. 332 (1934): "A business visitor is a person who
is invited or permitted to enter or remain on land in the possession of another for
a purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings between them."
See especially Comment b, which makes it clear that a "mutuality of business
interests" is required for the entrant to fall into the category of a business invitee.
'For other definitions which the court cited with approval, see WoRDs AN
PmtAsEs. (1940).
'Would the result have been different if the plaintiff had been a solicitor
for a private charity? Or for a civic boosters club, like the Chamber of Commerce? Or for an organization like the Automobile Association of America?
'See: T.V.A. v. Stratton, 806 Ky. 753, 209 S.W. 2d 318 (1948); Shoffner v.
Pilkerton,
292 Ky. 407, 166 S.W. 2d 870 (1942).
7
'RESTATEMNT,

ToaTs sec. 332. Note that the Restatement defines its terms

in such a way as to destroy this possibility of seduction by semantics. The Restatement uses the more precise term "business visitor" instead of the more common
"business invited". Hence the fact that there is an "invitation" does not lead one
to conclude that the entrant its an "invitee."
Brauner v. Leutz, 293 Ky. 406, 169 S.W. 2d 4 (1943); L. E. Meyers Co. v.
Logue's Adm'r, 212 Ky. 802, 280 S.W. 2d 107 (1926). See also: Madisonville v.
Poole, 249 S.W. 2d 133 (Ky. 1952); Durbin v. Louisville and Nashville Railroad,
310 Ky. 144, 219 S.W. 2d 995 (1949); Dodd Trucking Service v. Raney, 302 Ky.
116, 194 S.W. 2d 84 (1946); Kentucky & West Virginia Power Co. v. Stacy, 291
Ky. 325, 164 S.W. 2d 537 (1942); Eggner v. Hickman, 274 Ky. 550, 119 S.W. 2d
633 (1938).
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After demonstrating that, in its opinion, the plaintiff was a licensee,
the court proceeded to describe the duty owed to such a person.
At most, Reverend Ockerman was a licensee to whom the garage owed
no duty as to the condition of the premises other than that of not

knowingly letting him run upon a hidden peril or wilfllly or wantonly
causing him harm ....9
There is a duty to refrain from wilful and wanton conduct even
to trespassers. 10 Just what is this duty owed to licensees to refrain
from "knowingly permitting him to run upon a hidden peril"? If by
this the court means that the occupant will be liable only if he stands
by and knowingly watches a licensee walk into a dangerous condition
on the land, the duty owed to licensees becomes no higher than that
which, according to some authorities, is owed to trespassers. 1 Or is
the court attempting to state a view similar to that of the Restatement,
sec. 842,12 that the owner has a duty to warn a licensee of dangers of
which the occupant has knowledge? Since the facts of this case did
not require it, there was no need for the court to spell out all of the
law on the subject of licensees, for example, whether or not there is a
duty to discover the presence of licensees. But the court could have
gone into more detail in stating the exact duty owed a discovered
licensee. That they did not do so is particularly unfortunate since
there is considerable doubt as to what the Kentucky rule on this
question actually is.

The Kentucky cases fall into three general groups. The first holds

3
that licensees are entitled to no greater protection than trespassers,'
i.e., the occupant's only duty is to refrain from inflicting willful and
wanton harm. The second group of cases goes to the opposite extreme
and appears to say that certain types of licensees, namely those on
the land in response to a direct invitation, are entitled to the same
1oSupra

note 1, at 297.
°PnossEn, TORTS 613; 65 C.J.S. 438 (1950); 38 Am.Jun. 774 (1941).

' PRossE ,

supra note 10, at 614.
TORTS sec. 342 (1934) "A possessor of land is subject to

RESTATEMENT,

liability for bodily harm caused to gratuitous licensees by a natural or artificial
condition thereon if, but only if, he: (a) knows of the condition and realizes that
it involves an unreasonable risk to them, and has reason to believe that they will
not discover the condition or realize the risk, and (b) invites or permits one to
enter or remain on the land, without exercising reasonable care (i)to make the
condition reasonably safe, or (ii) to warn them of the condition and the risk
involved therein."
1T.V.A. v. Stratton, 306 Ky. 753, 209 S.W. 2d 318 (1948); Shaver's
Adrm'r v. Louisville Gas & Electric Co., 207 Ky. 180, 268 S.W. 1082 (1925);
Bales v. Louisville and Nashville Railroad, 179 Ky. 207, 200 S.W. 471 (1918).
See also: Dodd Trucking Service v. Ramey, 302 Ky. 116, 194 S.W. 2d 84 (1946);
Brauner v. Leutz, 293 Ky. 406, 169 S.W. 2d 4 (1943); Dennis Admr v. Kentucky and West Virginia Power Co., 258 Ky. 106, 79 S.W. 2d 377 (1935); Louisville and Nashville Railroad v. Page, 203 Ky. 755, 263 S.W. 20 (1924).

BECENT CASES

degree of care as a business invitee, 14 that is, that the owner has a
duty to make a reasonable effort to discover dangerous conditions on
the premises and to warn the entrant of their existence. A third group
of cases adheres to the rule of the Restatement of Torts, that the occupant of land has a: duty to warn of dangers of which he has actual
knowledge.' 5
A good deal of the court's opinion in the instant case was taken up
in distinguishing Kentucky and West Virginia Power Co. v. Stacy, 16
which permitted a licensee to recover when he was injured in an explosion resulting from one of defendant's employees carrying a torch
into a room known to be filled with dangerous gas fumes. The Ockerman case is clearly distinguishable from the Stacy case since in the
Stacy case the defendant knew of the dangerous condition, while in
the Ockerman case, he didn't; the elevator was thought to be in good
7

condition.'

But the court distinguished the Stacy case on the ground that in
that case there was an act of negligence subsequent to the discovery
of the presence of the licensee, while in the Ockerman case there was
only a passive asquiescence in the status quo. This is a possible distinction, but it has the disadvantage of lending support to the view
that a licensee is owed no higher duty than a trespasser, since
there is owed to trespassers a duty to refrain from acts of negligence subsequent to his discovery.' 8 The implication is that the court
might have denied recovery under the facts in the Stacy case had the
gas been detonated by any cause other than defendant's active negligence subsequent to the discovery of the licensee. The better rule,
and that of the Restatement, would have permitted recovery even in
that event since the defendant had failed to warn its licensees of a
known dangerous condition, in this case, a room filled with gas fumes.
In conclusion, it is submitted that the result reached by the court
in the Ockerman case is in accord with the weight of authority. Taking
the majority view that the defendant had a duty to warn the plaintiff
of known defects, there would still be no liability since the defendant
was ignorant of the defective condition of the elevator. It is, however,
" Young & Adm'r v. Farmers & Depositors Bank, 267 Ky. 845, 103 S.W. 2d
667 (1937); Leonard v. Enterprise Realty Co., 187 Ky. 578, 219 S.W. 1066
(1920). This is hardly surprising in the light of the discussion above which
showed that the Court had occasionally indicated that one on the land in response
to an invitation was an invitee.
Kentucky and West Virginia Power Co. v. Stacy, 291 Ky. 325, 164 S.W.
2d 537 (1942). See also: Beard v. Klusmeier, 158 Ky. 153, 164 S.W. 319 (1914).
'"291 Ky. 325, 164 S.W. 2d 537 (1942).
"Supra note 1, at 298.
a RESTATEMENT, TonRs sec. 338 (1934); Pnossam, supra note 10, at 614; 65
C.J.S. 444 (1950); 38 Am. Jutn. 775 (1941).
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unfortunate that the court did not spell out more precisely the exact
duty owed a licensee. It is hoped that the court will straighten out
the conflicting Kentucky law as soon as it is required to decide a case
on this particular point, and will adopt the Restatement view on the
subject, which seems to be the better view. 19
Tom SoYAs

